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Chapter 1 
The Question of Interest Group Influence1
 
Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre 





Interest groups are a major channel through which citizens can express their 
opinions to decision-makers.2 Their participation in policymaking may 
improve decision-making processes by supporting policies that are in line 
with citizen preferences and blocking policies that solely reflect the interests 
of the governing elite. At the same time, however, intense interest group 
pressures may make it difficult for policy-makers to implement the most 
efficient policies since such policies often impose costs on parts of the public. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is a reprint of: 
Dür, Andreas ; De Bièvre, Dirk (2007), The Question of Interest Group Influence, in: Journal 
of Public Policy, 27/ 1: 1-12. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the permission to reprint this chapter granted by 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
2 We would like to thank the contributors to the special issue for incisive discussions of the 
issues covered in the introduction in our meetings in Budapest and Vienna. We also are 
grateful for the helpful comments received from Michelle Beyeler, Richard Rose, Frank 
Vipert, Arndt Wonka, and two anonymous referees. The Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Vienna deserves gratitude for hosting our second meeting. Finally, this publication has been 
possible thanks of the support of CONNEX, the Network of Excellence on efficient and 
democratic governance in the EU, funded under the EU’s 6th Framework Programme of 
Research. 
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Competition among interest groups over the distribution of economic gains 
may also slow down the rate of economic growth (Olson 1982). Finally, if 
some groups constantly win, interest group politics may undermine the 
legitimacy of electorally accountable decision making in a democracy. 
A normative assessment of the role of interest groups in democracies thus 
crucially depends upon how much power interest groups have, and how 
power is distributed among different groups. Moreover, an understanding of 
the role of interest groups in the policymaking process is essential for 
explanations of policy outcomes. Finally, analysts trying to advise government 
on policies also have to be aware of the power of interest groups, as this 
factor determines the political feasibility of different suggestions. In short, 
research into variations in influence across groups and political systems is 
important for a series of reasons. Recognising this fact, political scientists have 
long engaged in theoretical debates on this issue (Dahl 1961; Mills 1956; 
Almond 1988). 
 
Over the last few decades, however, political scientists’ attention to the 
question has rather waned, at the same time as the number of interest groups 
in developed countries has increased (Baumgartner and Leech 2001: 1192). In 
particular, only very few studies have addressed the question of interest group 
power and influence for the case of Europe, both at the national and at the 
European Union (EU) levels (for some exceptions, see Bernhagen and 
Bräuninger 2005; Henning 2004; Michalowitz 2004; Schneider and Baltz 
2004; see also the review of this literature in Dür 2005). Instead, a large part 
of the field of interest group studies in Europe has been preoccupied with 
finding out why interest groups use access or voice strategies, why they form 
coalitions, and whether a specific system of interest representation could be 
classified as being pluralist, corporatist, or network like (Eising 2004). Others 
have analysed the determinants of interest groups’ access to decision-makers 
rather than tackling the question of influence head on (Bouwen 2002; 
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Henning 2004). Although more work on the question of influence has been 
done for the case of the United States (Fordham and McKeown 2003; 
Gilligan 1997; Sheingate 2001; Smith 2000), also there the question of 
influence arguably remains an area of confusion (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998: 13; but see the recent attempt at resolving these ambiguities in Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). Last but not least, the potential for coming to generalisations 
through comparative research on both the US and the EU political system 
has been left largely unexploited (for an exception, see Mahoney 2006). 
 
The authors in this special issue are keen on improving on this state of the art 
by renewing political scientists’ attention to the question of interest group 
power and influence. The special issue is the fruit of two workshops where 
researchers presented specially commissioned papers using different 
approaches to interest group influence. We met for the first time as a panel 
during the General Conference of the European Consortium for Political 
Research in Budapest in September 2005, and for a second time during a 
workshop held at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Vienna in June 2006. 
As a result of the repeated exchanges of ideas, the special issue starts from a 
common core of questions and concepts. 
 
We view the demise of research on the influence of interest groups mainly as 
a result of the notorious difficulty to operationalise the concepts of 
“influence” and “power”, to construct reliable indicators, and to measure 
these empirically, whether qualitatively or quantitatively. Early studies of 
interest group power in the United States were criticised for their alleged 
failure to take into account the existence of different “faces of power”. 
Initially, criticisms mainly focused on the neglect of the power that is 
exercised at the agenda setting stage (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). If certain 
issues are not even on the political agenda, groups interested in them are 
thereby deprived of an opportunity to exert influence or power. Later, it was 
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pointed out that some people may not be aware of their “genuine interests”, 
an issue problematised in the debate about the “third face of power” (Lukes 
1974; Shapiro 2006). Again, the workings of this face of power could lead to 
certain topics being kept from the political agenda because actors do not even 
realise that they have a stake in them. With the theoretical literature on 
power becoming increasingly elaborate as a result of these amendments, it 
gradually became more difficult to study power empirically without being 
criticised for violating some aspects of the concept. The response of scholars 
interested in empirically examining political processes has been to avoid the 
topic altogether. Rather than give up on this topic, we endorse a pragmatic 
response. Given the importance of different faces of power, no single analysis 
necessarily has to (or even can) consider all of them. Studies may concentrate 
on the possibility of actors not defending their genuine interests or assume 
stable actor preferences, as long as authors show awareness that their choice 
limits the generalisability of their findings.  
 
In this special issue we opt for a common approach that understands power as 
“control over outcomes”, with the other two possible conceptualisations of 
power being “control over resources” and “control over actors” (Hart 1976). 
We use the term “influence” to denote control over political outcomes. Our 
approach regards actors as being powerful if they manage to influence 
outcomes in a way that brings them closer to their ideal points; thus, we are 
interested in studying the effect of power rather than in assessing power itself. 
A political outcome can come in two guises: the official position taken by 
public authorities or the actual implementation of that policy. Each offers 
different touchstones for a comparative analysis of actor preferences and 
political outcomes. This conceptualisation of influence does not attempt to 
measure an abstract, unobservable object, “power”, but focus on its 
empirically observable effects in actual public policy, as if actors were really 
powerful (see also De Bièvre 2007). The approach assumes that actors have 
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clear preferences over outcomes. Of course, actors may not voice or have 
clear preferences at the onset of the policy process, or may change their 
preferences as a result of interaction with other actors. Despite these 
limitations, we consider the control over outcomes approach to be the 
epistemologically most sound and empirically most pragmatic route towards 
assessing interest group influence.  
Factors shaping the influence of interest groups 
The existing literature offers a range of hypotheses on factors that may 
systematically affect the relative influence of interest groups over political 
outcomes: institutions, interest group characteristics, and issue-specific factors 
(Dür 2005; Smith 1995; Van Winden 2003). 
Variation in influence across institutional structures 
Interest group influence is expected to vary depending on the institutions of 
government that they interact with (Mahoney, this volume). In particular, a 
series of authors suggest that institutions influence the domestic balance of 
interests. In this view, institutions may empower or disenfranchise specific 
interests. To pick one example, the EU’s institutional structure may 
strengthen concentrated interests to the detriment of diffuse interests 
(Schneider and Baltz 2004). The idea behind this reasoning is that 
policymakers can give in to welfare-reducing demands from special interest 
groups only to the extent that voters do not punish them for doing so. 
Increasing information asymmetries between voters and their political agents 
due to higher costs of monitoring, then, encourage shirking by public actors. 
Consequently, the lack of transparency created by the complex institutional 
structure of the EU should decrease diffuse interests’ control over policy 
outputs. A similar institutionalist argument has been made for the case of the 
United States, where the delegation of trade policymaking authority from 
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Congress to the president – an institutional change – supposedly empowered 
exporting interests to the detriment of import-competing interests (Gilligan 
1997). 
 
In addition, institutions may enhance or lower the access domestic groups 
enjoy to policymakers. The pluralist interest group system of the United 
States, according to one view, enhances interest group access to political 
actors. By allowing different groups to have equal access, however, the 
institutional structure also ensures that specific concentrated interests cannot 
monopolise the policymaking process, at least not in the field of agriculture 
(Sheingate 2001). Others point out that several layers of decision-making 
open up new channels of influence and make it easier for diffuse interests to 
influence policy outcomes, a reasoning that has mainly been applied to the 
EU (Pollack 1997; Smith 2001). The existence of additional venues in the 
EU even can lead to the break-up of established policy communities at the 
domestic level, thus allowing previously excluded actors to influence policy 
outcomes (Richardson 2000). This is so because additional layers of 
government enhance incentives for venue shopping, as actors can try and shift 
issues to more favourably disposed parts of government bureaucracies 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). At the same time, additional venues may 
increase the autonomy of public actors by enabling them to use commitments 
reached at one level to reject demands voiced by societal actors (Grande 
1996; Moravcsik 1994; Pappi and Henning 1999). Following this line of 
reasoning, the president of the United States may have delegated specific 
authority to the North American Free Trade Area with the objective of 
committing the United States to a more liberal trade policy, thus 
undermining the influence of domestic groups lobbying for import protection 
(Goldstein 1996). Going beyond these two contradictory positions, one can 
hypothesise that the impact of additional layers of governance on interest 
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group influence may vary across different types of actors (Princen, this 
volume). 
 
Finally, institutions can shape the resource needs of politicians. Whenever 
institutions make decision-makers rely on interest group resources, interest 
groups should gain influence over policy outcomes. For example, institutional 
systems that create electoral competition among politicians may make them 
dependent on campaign financing and public political support. In the United 
States, the existence of a presidential system, which weakens parties, in 
combination with an electoral system that concentrates electoral campaigns 
for members of the House of Representatives to relatively small districts, may 
be particularly prone to interest group influence to the detriment of the 
general electorate. It may well be that this direct electoral accountability raises 
politicians’ reliance on moneyed interests for their re-election (Mahoney, this 
volume). In contrast, multi-member districts and coalition governments, as 
they often occur in European political systems, may make political parties 
stronger and less dependent on organised interests. Interestingly, in the case of 
the European Commission it may be the lack of direct electoral competition, 
and thus of procedural legitimacy, that increases this actor’s eagerness for 
input from societal groups. In addition, relative to its extensive policy agenda, 
the European Commission can be understaffed and more dependent on 
outside input and information than other institutions (McLaughlin, Jordan 
and Maloney 1993).  
Variation in influence across interest groups 
Several hypotheses link interest group characteristics to groups’ influence over 
policy outcomes. Groups with more resources should, ceteris paribus, have 
more influence than groups with little resources. Following Dahl (1961: 226), 
resources can be defined as “anything that can be used to sway the specific 
choices or the strategies of another individual.” Interest groups may have 
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different types of resources: campaign funding, information on constituency 
interests, expertise on policy issues, and information on the opinions of other 
policy makers. As long as politicians depend on resources either for re-
election or to achieve their policy aims, interest groups may exchange their 
resources for influence over outcomes. Domestic groups disposing of private 
information may thereby gain influence over policy outcomes (Henning 
2004; Lohmann 1998). When all interest groups are endowed with the same 
resources, however, politicians are likely to play out one group against 
another, making sure that interest groups cannot exchange their resources for 
influence. Under some circumstances, interest groups may even depend on 
resources from the state for their organisational survival, making them 
available for instrumentalisation by public actors. 
 
Influence may also vary according to the type of actor, namely whether or 
not a group defends diffuse or concentrated interests (Dür and De Bièvre, this 
volume; Mahoney, this volume). Diffuse interests should find it more difficult 
to get organised than concentrated interests (Olson 1965). In the extreme 
case, such interests can influence political outcomes only through elections as 
they are unable to overcome collective action problems. Interest groups 
defending diffuse interests may also be disadvantaged to the extent that 
specific resources, such as money or expertise, are important. The general 
expectation is for nongovernmental organisations to be less well endowed 
with these resources than concentrated interests. By contrast, groups 
defending diffuse interests may have an advantage whenever they can make 
use of grassroots members and the possession of the “moral high ground”. 
Business groups, as a specific subtype of concentrated interests, can benefit 
from firms’ structural power. They can use firms’ threats to relocate 
investment and employment across borders to gain influence (Frieden and 
Rogowski 1996; Bernhagen and Bräuninger 2005). Such structural power, 
however, does not necessarily run counter to diffuse interests, at least if it 
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leads to the implementation of policies that increase the competitiveness of an 
economy. 
Variation in influence across issues 
The most important distinction explaining why interest group influence 
varies from one issue or policy field to another is that between distributive, 
regulatory, and redistributive policies (Lowi 1964), since the type of policy 
should influence the likelihood of the existence of counterlobbies. Opposing 
groups are most likely with respect to regulatory policies, where often both 
sides on an issue face either concentrated costs or concentrated benefits from 
a policy. The existence of heterogeneous interests among major 
constituencies, in turn, may open the way for state actors to pursue their 
preferred policies, by compensating opponents and creating coalitions in 
support of specific policy options. In distributive policies, by contrast, it may 
be easier for groups to find coalition partners that all support each other in a 
logroll, as major constituencies have homogenous interests. In such a 
scenario, interest group influence should be substantial. As redistributive 
policies produce diffuse costs for many people, but also small benefits for 
many people, interest group collective action and hence their influence 
should be rather small in comparison to distributive or regulatory policies. 
 
Interest group influence may also depend on the salience of an issue 
(Mahoney, this volume). The more attention the public pays to a specific 
decision, the more difficult it should be for special interest groups to 
influence outcomes. On such issues, a legislator cannot easily deviate from 
voters’ interests without fearing punishment in the next election. However, 
salience is an elusive concept. It may be endogenous to the policy process, if 
actors raise the saliency of an issue in the public’s perception for strategic 
reasons. For NGOs defending diffuse interests, for example, increasing the 
salience of an issue may be an efficient strategy to enhance their influence.  
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The “technicality” of an issue may also explain variation in influence across 
issues, insofar as it determines the resource requirements of politicians (Woll, 
this volume). As the level of technicality of an issue increases, decision-
makers’ need for input from societal actors, such as expert information, 
should increase as well (Coen and Grant 2005). At the same time, interest 
groups able to supply the necessary information should gain in influence. 
Finally, variation across issues in interest group influence may also stem from 
variation in the strategies chosen by lobbies, as groups do not always pick the 
most effective strategy to influence policy outcomes.  
Overcoming Some Obstacles 
Several obstacles make the testing of these rival hypotheses in empirical 
research difficult. This special issue seeks to show how these obstacles can be 
overcome. For one, the problems associated with any attempt at establishing 
preferences (Tsebelis 2005) makes measuring the degree of influence difficult. 
Often, it may be erroneous to equate voiced positions with preferences. 
When different actors are engaged in a bargaining game, it makes sense for 
them to exaggerate their demands in order to get as good a result as possible 
(Ward 2004). Therefore, a relatively large discrepancy between final policy 
outcomes and the positions voiced by some interest groups does not 
necessarily serve as an indication of their weakness. Instead, a specific policy 
outcome may satisfy a group’s preferences to a large extent, even if it is still 
far from the group’s previously voiced position. In this special issue, some 
articles find it easier to deal with preferences than others. Illustratively, it 
seems less problematic to establish the preferences of the tobacco industry in 
the antismoking debate (Princen, this volume) than of rather diffuse citizen 
groups in the case of the access to medicine campaign (Dür and De Bièvre, 
this volume). 
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Another obstacle is that a group’s lobbying may not be the only force pushing 
outcomes in one direction. If a group takes a position that is also supported 
by public opinion, its influence over outcomes may appear larger than it 
actually is, insofar as public opinion is an independent influence. The 
opposite case is a situation in which a group’s attempts at influence are 
countered by lobbying efforts of other groups, public opinion and political 
parties. In such a case of counteractive lobbying (Austen-Smith and Wright 
1994), the power of a group is likely to be underestimated. One possibility 
for how to deal with such countervailing pressures is to use counterfactual 
reasoning (Lebow 2000), considering what would have happened in the 
absence of the lobbying of a specific group. In practice, this means that the 
researcher has to be explicit about the model of decision-making that she uses 
in order for her to be able to engage in comparative statics. The necessity of 
spelling out the causal mechanism, however, involves a trade off, as it makes 
generalisations more difficult at the same time as it increases the validity of 
the findings. In this special issue, all contributors are aware of the need to deal 
with countervailing pressures. Doing so proves to be particularly 
straightforward in studies relying on process-tracing, while for quantitative 
analyses data requirements make it a very difficult task. 
 
Finally, the existence of several pathways to influence (Dür 2005) poses an 
obstacle for the measurement of influence. Societal actors may try to 
influence policy outcomes by (1) seeking direct access to decision-makers, (2) 
influencing the selection of decision-makers, (3) using voice strategies to 
shape public opinion, and (4) employing structural coercion power. Access 
refers to interest groups’ direct expression of demands to decision-makers 
(Beyers 2004; Bouwen 2002; Hansen 1991). Influence may also be wielded 
before the policy process has really started, at the moment of selecting public 
actors (Fordham and McKeown 2003; Moe 2006). Another pathway to 
influence is interest groups’ use of “voice” to try to influence public opinion 
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through manifestations, rallies, petitions, press statements, and campaigning 
(Beyers 2004; Gerber 1999; Kollman 1998). Finally, economic actors may 
employ structural power by making their decisions on when and where to 
allocate their funds dependent on the implementation of specific policies. A 
threat of exit or promise of entry may induce political actors to implement 
policies that are in line with the interests of these investors without the latter 
engaging in actual lobbying. In this special issue, contributors pay attention to 
different pathways to influence. 
 
The collection of articles in this special issue illustrates the strengths of 
different approaches in dealing with these obstacles. Quantitative studies 
drawing on a random sample allow for generalisations across issue areas. 
Studies using process tracing in specific policy fields can provide more in-
depth assessments of actor preferences and a relatively comprehensive survey 
of countervailing forces. Comparisons of several cases are often a good 
compromise between the more detailed analysis of process tracing and the 
greater generalisability resulting from a larger number of cases. 
Structure of the special issue 
Christine Mahoney undertakes a quantitative analysis of interest group 
influence in the United States and the EU across 47 policy issues, building on 
149 interviews with advocates in Washington, DC, and Brussels. She assesses 
the relative importance of issue specific and interest group variables, and of 
institutional factors such as electoral accountability and legislative rules in 
determining the influence of specific societal actors. While she finds some 
variation between the EU and the United States, issue-specific factors such as 
the salience of an event and the degree of conflict over an issue play a more 
important role.  
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In a case study of public health policy, Sebastiaan Princen criticises the 
literature that dealt with the question of the effects of an additional level of 
governance for conceptualising the state and society as unitary actors. He 
contends that we should inquire which societal and which state actors gain 
from the existence of several layers of decision-making. Using the concept of 
advocacy coalitions, Princen suggests three causal mechanisms through which 
international activities can impact upon the national level: establishing rules, 
providing new allies, and supplying information that may affect beliefs and 
expectations. He also sets out a series of conditions under which the addition 
of an extra layer of decision-making should impact the domestic balance of 
interests. Two case studies of anti-smoking and alcoholism policies reveal 
some significant differences. The effect of the internationalisation of anti-
smoking policy on state society relations was more pronounced than the 
effect of the EU taking up alcoholism as an issue. 
 
In a further contribution, Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre ask whether the 
inclusion of new societal groups concerned with the environment, labour, 
and development in EU trade policy making has caused a shift in policy 
outcomes. We theorize that such diffuse interests should not have gained 
influence over policy outcomes, as they often cannot provide decision-
makers with valuable resources. A survey of these actors, and two case studies 
of the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements with developing 
countries and of the debates over improved access to medicines in developing 
countries, largely confirm our reasoning. 
 
In a final contribution, Cornelia Woll contends that two problems often 
cripple attempts at studying interest group influence. First, it may be difficult 
to establish the genuine preferences of domestic actors. Economic actors 
themselves may find it difficult to figure out which policy they should prefer, 
making preferences unstable. This creates a substantial problem for attempts at 
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measuring influence as the distance between initial preferences and outcomes. 
Second, the lack of conflict between actors may make it difficult to establish 
influence. When actors are dependent on each other, they may be dissuaded 
from pursuing short-term goals in order to maintain cooperation in pursuit of 
long-term common goals. After studying exchange relationships between 
business interests and public authorities in three case studies of transatlantic 
trade negotiations over financial and telecommunications services and air 
transport, Woll concludes that in certain cases it may be preferable for 
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